Articles

Russia chose to fight American-armed Georgia over the territory of South Ossetia - a piece of land the size of Rhode Island and containing only 70,000 people. Why? And what are the implications for the United States and Russia's neighbors?

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is at it again. In late July, Iran's firebrand president used a meeting of the foreign ministers of the Nonaligned Movement (NAM) in Tehran as the platform for a renewed call to arms in the Third World. In his remarks before the summit, Mr. Ahmadinejad blamed the West for everything from the spread of AIDS to nuclear proliferation, and called on the NAM countries to band together to create an alternative to the United Nations as a way of becoming "the pioneer of peace and justice in the world."

With a housing crisis in full bloom, and a presidential campaign in overdrive, Americans can be forgiven for overlooking the frenetic race to salvage the US-India civil nuclear agreement now underway. First came Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's narrow triumph in a no-confidence vote in parliament last month. Manmohan stood down fierce opposition from the left and, in a chaotic and unruly session, risked his governing coalition by forcing the vote. Only weeks later, on August 1, the International Atomic Energy Agency signaled its approval of India's draft plan for inspection, clearing the second of four hurdles. Only the 45-member Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), where approval is likely, and the US Congress, where nothing is guaranteed, now stand in the way.

As regular visitors to this site will notice, the American Foreign Policy Council's online presence is currently undergoing a major facelift. Once completed, our new website will feature more dynamic content, be more accessible to researchers, the public and the media, and provide greater coverage of our wide range of events and activities. In the meantime, please bear with us as we incorporate our past content into this new format. And, as always, thank you for your interest.

Give Nouri al-Maliki credit. Since assuming his post in May 2006, Iraq's embattled prime minister has been written off by more than a few observers as an agent of Iranian influence or a cat's paw of the US-led Coalition. However, since early this year, Al-Maliki has definitively proven that he is neither. In the process, he has moved his country considerably closer to lasting stability.

Officials in Europe are beginning to sound more and more like their American counterparts when it comes to Iran. In the wake of President Bush's trip to Europe, they even appear to be moving towards freezing the assets of Iran's largest bank as a way of signalling their resolve over Tehran's nuclear intransigence. In recent months, French President Nicolas Sarkozy has warned publicly that a nuclear Iran poses an "unacceptable risk for regional and world stability," and his government has taken the lead in calling for tougher international sanctions against the Islamic republic. German Chancellor Angela Merkel has made similar noises. "If Iran were to obtain nuclear weapons, it would have disastrous consequences," Merkel told Israel's parliament, the Knesset, during her visit there in March. "We have to prevent this." In practice, however, Europeans are sending a very different signal. Indeed, recent days have seen the Old Continent deal a body blow to efforts to isolate the Islamic Republic.
ÂÂ

What a difference eight months makes. Last September, General David Petraeus was essentially branded a liar for reporting to Congress that the situation in Iraq was improving markedly, that the so-called “surge” strategy was achieving its intended aims. Today, the general returns with more good news: violence in the country down 75 percent; Sunni sheiks cooperating with the government and Coalition (the “Anbar awakening”); and al-Qaeda in Iraq severely weakened and on the run. Unfortunately, General Petraeus will no doubt have to contend with a barrage of questions about the recent weeks’ fighting in Basra and Baghdad.

Slowly but surely, Iraq is turning a corner. In February, the Iraqi parliament approved two major measures aimed at normalising that country's fractious political scene. As significant as it is, however, this progress represents just one part of a larger picture. Indeed, future stability in Iraq may hinge as much on what transpires on two other strategic fronts as it does on the events now taking place in the so-called 'Sunni Triangle'.

It is axiomatic that nothing in government is so long lasting as temporary measures. Policies, programs and appropriations initiated to respond to a transitory issue take on lives of their own, spawning institutions which not only outlive their purpose but themselves create new problems to justify their continued existence. On the international stage today, the most egregious example of this principle is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). An alliance created in response to the devastation of the Second World War in Europe and the onset of the Cold War is now approaching its seventh decade, two generations beyond the restoration of Europe’s economy plus a large measure of European unity and a full generation beyond Gorbachev’s acceptance of failure in the Cold War.

Has it really been five years since the advent of Operation Iraqi Freedom? The war has gone on far too long, and been far too expensive. The mistakes made in the crucial transition period from major combat operations to “Phase Four” stability operations will be reviewed and debated for decades. But as the president pointed out in his Iraq-war anniversary speech at the Pentagon Wednesday, the comprehensive “surge” strategy has been working. The surge has been a runaway good-news story. And there is no more certain sign of progress in the war than its disappearance from media coverage. Stories on Iraq comprised only 3 percent of the news in the first ten weeks of 2008, compared to 23 percent a year ago — an 87 percent drop. “Good news” has turned out to be an oxymoron. No bleed, no lede.

It has been nearly five years since President George W. Bush stood on the deck of the U.S.S Abraham Lincoln and announced the end of major combat operations in Iraq. During that time, the United States has gotten a first-hand education in the complex ideological and religious frictions that simmer below the surface in the Muslim world. And while the Bush administration’s “surge” has now helped the Coalition regain the initiative in the former Ba’athist state, it has become abundantly clear that if Washington and its allies hope to maintain—and, better yet, to expand—their influence in the region as a whole, they still have a great deal to learn about what makes its inhabitants tick.

Adam Gadahn, a.k.a. Azzam al Amriki, has come a long way since his days living on a goat farm and playing in his one-man death metal band Aphasia. The 30-year-old California native has quickly become the American face of al Qaeda. Azzam’s purpose is to make an appeal to the American people, to explain the current situation in the war and to exhort them to join in supporting al Qaeda and its cause.

In recent weeks, the White House appeared to be gaining serious ground in its efforts to cobble together an international consensus to confront Iran. Today, however, Administration officials are desperately trying to put the pieces of their Iran policy back together. The culprit is the intelligence community's new National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), which asserts that the Iranian regime currently is not in the business of making nuclear weapons.

After a short two-year tenure, Karen Hughes now departs as Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. She concentrated on the public affairs area of her job by creating the Rapid Response Unit and regional media hubs—things that anyone would find hard to believe the U.S. government was not already doing before her arrival. Hughes inherited the detritus from the 1999 destruction of the U.S. Information Agency, and tried to put back some of the missing building blocks of public diplomacy. However, by almost every index, we are not doing well in the war of ideas. Some say we have already lost.

Timing, the old saying goes, is everything. Just ask Sen. Joseph Biden, Delaware Democrat. For years, he has been sounding the bell about the need to devolve Iraq into its constituent parts: one Kurdish, one Sunni and one Shi'ite. And for years, his suggestions about Iraqi "federalism" have fallen on deaf ears. But now, in the wake of Gen. David Petraeus' long-awaited September report on the "surge," Mr. Biden's idea for the former Ba'athist state is suddenly getting some traction.

Ever since its start six years ago, the United States has been waging the War on Terror chiefly on the Sunni side of the religious divide within Islam. The principal targets have been Al-Qaeda and its affiliates. As recently as September 2006, the White House’s counter-terrorism strategy was still focused overwhelmingly on the Bin Laden network and its offshoots, which were seen as the vanguard of “a transnational movement of extremist organizations, networks, and individuals” threatening the United States. By contrast, the vision articulated by the president in his 2007 State of the Union Address is substantially broader. It encompasses not only Sunni extremists, but their Shi‘a counterparts as well. And, for the first time, it clearly and unambiguously identifies not just “terrorism” but a specific state sponsor — the Islamic Republic of Iran — as a threat to U.S. interests and objectives in the greater Middle East.
ÂÂ

American politics is entering a phase in which China is likely to increase in prominence, and where the fundamentals of U.S. policy toward the People’s Republic are likely to be called into question. Over the next two years, the White House’s approach is unlikely to change. But the Democrat-controlled Congress and presidential contenders alike can be expected to critique Administration policy and offer alternatives to it.

Defying all of its critics, the Bush administration may still be hanging tough in Iraq, but on another critical front of the 'War on Terror' – Central Asia – Washington appears to be in full strategic retreat.

A storm is brewing along the Bosporus. Since late April, when Turkey’s military issued a not-so-subtle threat to intervene in national politics to curb the power of the Islamist government, the country has been mired in political crisis. The current turmoil has everything to do with Turkey’s deepening religious-secular divide.

You have to feel sorry for David Petraeus. The commander of the multinational force in Iraq already has his hands full overseeing the "surge." Now he needs to deal with another, equally pressing problem. According to Iraqi officials, Turkey has mobilized some 140,000 soldiers along its common border with Iraq, in a maneuver that many see as a prelude to some sort of military confrontation between the two countries.

Just what does Iran have to do in order to get the attention of the United States? That question must be on the minds of officials in Tehran these days. After all, their regime has embarked upon an audacious -- and very public -- strategic offensive throughout the greater Middle East. But officials in Washington, preoccupied with flagging poll numbers and the ongoing insurgency in Iraq, don't seem to be taking notice.
ÂÂ

With the Taliban on the march, its cities paralyzed by demonstrations and its president targeted four times for assassination, Pakistan is facing its most severe crisis since the 1999 coup that brought Gen. Pervez Musharraf to power. Over the past few months, surging Islamic extremism and widespread political unrest have erupted into violence, undermining the government's authority. Now, with elections on the horizon and the general's heavy-handed tactics aggravating tensions, Washington is being forced to reexamine one of its most critical and controversial alliances in the war on terror.

Ever since the Turkish parliament's fateful decision to deny the United States a northern front against Saddam Hussein's regime back in early 2003, Iraq has emerged as the defining foreign policy issue between Washington and Ankara. But now, a different—and potentially even more serious—challenge to strategic ties looms on the horizon.

In late February, just days after the expiration of yet another United Nations deadline, and with the UN Security Council gearing up to deliberate new punitive measures, Iran's firebrand president issued a defiant public statement. The Iranian nuclear program "is without brakes and a rear gear," Mahmoud Ahmadinejad told religious leaders in Tehran in comments carried nationwide by state radio. "We dismantled the rear gear and brakes of the train and threw them away some time ago." The demarche was emblematic of the deepening crisis that has beset the international community since the fall of 2002, when a controversial opposition group disclosed previously unknown details about Iran's nuclear program. Since then, it has become abundantly clear that the Iranian regime is not simply developing a nuclear program for "peaceful purposes," as its officials stubbornly claim. Rather, mounting evidence indicates that the Islamic Republic is embarked upon a comprehensive, multi-faceted national endeavor to develop a nuclear arsenal—and that it is making serious progress towards that goal, in spite of international pressure.

A conservative, the old adage goes, is a liberal who has been mugged by reality. Today, nowhere is this saying more apt than in the case of proponents of U.S.-Iranian “dialogue,” who are getting a harsh dose of reality about the true intentions of the ayatollahs in Tehran. Just ahead of yesterday’s planned U.S.-Iranian meeting to discuss Iraq, the Islamic Republic has launched a vicious crackdown on Iranian-American scholars and activists. The most high-profile victim of this offensive is Haleh Esfandiari, the head of the Middle East program at the Washington-based Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, who was rounded up May 8 on charges of trying to foment a “soft revolution” against the Iranian regime. Ever since, she has languished in Tehran’s notorious Evin Prison, in spite of public entreaties for her release from prominent policymakers and senior statesmen.

By now, the nearly two-week-long hostage crisis prompted by Iran's brazen seizure of 15 British sailors and marines in the Persian Gulf in late March is beginning to fade from public memory. But the incident has provided the West with an important glimpse into Iranian strategy - and an unprecedented opportunity for a reinvigorated transatlantic consensus about confronting the Islamic Republic. From the start, Iran's ayatollahs used the well-orchestrated seizure as a flagrant piece of political theater. The goal? To signal their regime's resolve in the deepening crisis over its nuclear program. The message - coming just days after the U.N. Security Council's passage of a second round of sanctions on Iran for its unauthorized nuclear work - was unmistakable: The Iranian regime is ready and willing to fight for its atomic effort.

Five-and-a-half years after September 11th, the United States finally appears to have acknowledged the necessity of effective intelligence to its national security in the 21st century. The Bush administration, inheritor of a deeply flawed institution at its inauguration, was forced to confront this reality after a string of intelligence failures and foreign policy setbacks that culminated in the Iraq war.

President Bush managed to harness momentum from the disaster of 9/11 to institute the most extensive overhaul of American intelligence in decades. Yet, in true Washington form, time, attention and effort is not necessarily an indicator of success. Indeed, the Bush administration’s victories have been too few and far between, and its agenda for reform too susceptible to stalling or reversal. Momentum toward transformation likewise has been tempered by competing political interests and the inertia of Congress. The resulting track record has been mixed; the task incomplete.

What a difference a few years can make. In September 2002, less than a year after taking office, the Bush administration laid out a breathtakingly ambitious vision of American foreign policy. “The United States possesses unprecedented—and unequaled—strength and influence in the world,” the newly-released National Security Strategy of the United States proudly proclaimed. “Sustained by faith in the principles of liberty, and the value of a free society, this position comes with unparalleled responsibilities, obligations, and opportunity. The great strength of this nation must be used to promote a balance of power that favors freedom.” But less than five years later, that vision appears to be in full strategic retreat.

The U.S.-Australia alliance is one of the cornerstones of American regional security strategy in East Asia. Years of work by successive administrations in Washington and Canberra have forged both trust and synergy in the two nations’ strategic objectives. Of course, no two countries share identical interests. But perhaps more then any other bilateral relationship in East Asia, America’s partnership with Australia is rooted in common values and a common vision for the region.

Nearly five years after September 11, it is fair to say that the U.S. government remains challenged by how to combat the ideology of radical Islamists. In some ways, this is not surprising. The West now faces a challenge in an area - religious controversy - which the modern state prefers to leave to individual discretion, and in which it is not accustomed to contend. Moreover, the struggle is taking place within a largely unfamiliar religion, in an area in which the West is, at best, tone-deaf. Nevertheless, this new “war of ideas” must be joined and won if the United States is to address what have become grave threats to its security.

This spring, practically unnoticed by the mainstream media, the battle lines were formally drawn in the “war of ideas.” President George W. Bush used his January 2005 inaugural address to deliver an unapologetic tribute to freedom and the premises that undergird Western liberalism: liberty, the individual, and self-government.In response, Jordanian terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, Osama Bin Laden’s chief lieutenant in Iraq, released an audiotape of his own. In it, he denounced the very principles President Bush has pledged to promote.This frank exchange should serve as a useful primer for all of those who believe that the War on Terror is at its core a struggle against global privation, or a cross-cultural misunderstanding that can be settled by a search for common ground. Quite the opposite is true. We are engaged in an ideological conflict that resists compromise.

The battle for Iraq may still be far from over, but its impact is already sending shockwaves throughout the Middle East. Militarily, Washington's early successes have put to rest any lingering doubts about U.S. capabilities or American resolve. But more significant still is the example set by Iraq's impending liberation, and the accompanying realization that is taking root in the region — that Baghdad's fall could foreshadow even greater change.

A silver lining in the trans-Atlantic storm clouds over Iraq is the damage done to NATO. This costly foreign entanglement was long overdue for a body blow. NATO was not intended, by Americans at least, to be a permanent commitment, but an interim measure while Western Europe recovered from the War. When the first Supreme Allied Commander, Dwight Eisenhower, obtained congressional consent to station U.S. divisions in Europe, he promised and believed they would be there only a few years. But, like Marx's "withering away of the state," Europe proved resilient in allowing America to shoulder Europe's burden long after its prosperity dwarfed the laggard socialist economies and even after the Soviet collapse. The European Union today integrates everything except defense, lest it make too obvious that Europe is more than able to look after itself.

Even as it girds for war in the Persian Gulf, the Bush Administration faces a major challenge in East Asia – that of a nuclear North Korea. The conflict emerged quite suddenly. Back in October, Pyongyang stunned the White House with its unexpected admission of an active clandestine nuclear program. The disclosure was followed, in rapid succession, by the DPRK’s December decision to restart its Yongbyon nuclear facility and expel International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors. A month later, North Korea abruptly withdrew from the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and rolled back its self-imposed 1999 moratorium on missile testing. Together, these moves have presented Washington with an unprecedented – and escalating – problem on the Korean Peninsula.

What a difference a year makes. Twelve months ago, the coalition government of Bulent Ecevit in Turkey had risen to the forefront of U.S. regional allies in the Middle East, contributing heavily to America's Afghan campaign. Today, Washington is deadlocked with Ankara, now led by the Justice and Development Party (AKP), over the next phase in its war on terrorism: military action against Iraq.

The Soviet Union’s demise spelled the end of Russia as a European Great Power, although post-Soviet Russia remains a major European state and a power among others. Less obvious, but equally important, is Russia’s decline as an Asian Great Power. Moscow enjoyed this status for a relatively brief period and in large measure due to the weakness of China, Asia's historic continental hegemon. China’s recovery from external domination set the stage, despite the disasters of Mao’s policies, for its expansion as a major economic and regional political force. Today, China is reclaiming from Russia its place as the leading land power in Asia—the country others must always take into account. This is a momentous transformation in Asian affairs and of great importance to the United States.

What next for the U.S. and Europe? With lingering disagreements over Iraq, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and foreign policy in general, U.S.-EU ties seem headed for increasingly shaky ground. But largely unnoticed amid these differences, there are new signs of life to the transatlantic partnership. Slowly but surely, the Bush administration is working to tighten ties to allies in Europe through an unexpected issue — missile defense.

In 1991, while still Egyptian Foreign Minister, former United Nations Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali cautioned that the next war in the Middle East could be over water. Boutros-Ghali’s warning may have been prophetic, for water is reshaping the political landscape of the contemporary Middle East. For Turkey, water represents one of the most important, though least explored, items on the country’s contemporary security agenda.

The European Union is at it again. Last month, its executive body, the European Commission, voted to accept ten new members over the next two years. The candidates include countries from Eastern Europe, the Baltics, and even the Balkans. Conspicuously absent from the list was Turkey — a key NATO ally and a major partner in the war on terrorism.

In the last days of 2001, with little fanfare or public opposition, a remarkable new law went into effect in Russia. Enacted by President Vladimir Putin and key parliamentary supporters, this legislation officially codifies the procedures for peacefully expanding Russia's borders. It is no less than a blueprint for enlarging the Russian Federation, and one that could foreshadow a major push for "Greater Russia" on the part of the Kremlin.

As another war in Iraq seems to approach, Israelis can feel considerably more secure from missile attack than they did in 1991, when 39 Iraqi Scuds landed in Israel. The reason is the substantial improvement in Israeli missile defenses, an improvement that other nations understandably are seeking for themselves. Among the first in line interested in Israel's Arrow Theater Missile Defense system is, not surprisingly, India. Though the debate over whether to allow the purchase to go forward has not been given much attention, it could have momentous consequences for both American missile defense plans and US strategy in South Asia.