Articles

A conservative, the old adage goes, is a liberal who has been mugged by reality. Today, nowhere is this saying more apt than in the case of proponents of U.S.-Iranian “dialogue,” who are getting a harsh dose of reality about the true intentions of the ayatollahs in Tehran. Just ahead of yesterday’s planned U.S.-Iranian meeting to discuss Iraq, the Islamic Republic has launched a vicious crackdown on Iranian-American scholars and activists. The most high-profile victim of this offensive is Haleh Esfandiari, the head of the Middle East program at the Washington-based Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, who was rounded up May 8 on charges of trying to foment a “soft revolution” against the Iranian regime. Ever since, she has languished in Tehran’s notorious Evin Prison, in spite of public entreaties for her release from prominent policymakers and senior statesmen.

By now, the nearly two-week-long hostage crisis prompted by Iran's brazen seizure of 15 British sailors and marines in the Persian Gulf in late March is beginning to fade from public memory. But the incident has provided the West with an important glimpse into Iranian strategy - and an unprecedented opportunity for a reinvigorated transatlantic consensus about confronting the Islamic Republic. From the start, Iran's ayatollahs used the well-orchestrated seizure as a flagrant piece of political theater. The goal? To signal their regime's resolve in the deepening crisis over its nuclear program. The message - coming just days after the U.N. Security Council's passage of a second round of sanctions on Iran for its unauthorized nuclear work - was unmistakable: The Iranian regime is ready and willing to fight for its atomic effort.

Five-and-a-half years after September 11th, the United States finally appears to have acknowledged the necessity of effective intelligence to its national security in the 21st century. The Bush administration, inheritor of a deeply flawed institution at its inauguration, was forced to confront this reality after a string of intelligence failures and foreign policy setbacks that culminated in the Iraq war.

President Bush managed to harness momentum from the disaster of 9/11 to institute the most extensive overhaul of American intelligence in decades. Yet, in true Washington form, time, attention and effort is not necessarily an indicator of success. Indeed, the Bush administration’s victories have been too few and far between, and its agenda for reform too susceptible to stalling or reversal. Momentum toward transformation likewise has been tempered by competing political interests and the inertia of Congress. The resulting track record has been mixed; the task incomplete.

What a difference a few years can make. In September 2002, less than a year after taking office, the Bush administration laid out a breathtakingly ambitious vision of American foreign policy. “The United States possesses unprecedented—and unequaled—strength and influence in the world,” the newly-released National Security Strategy of the United States proudly proclaimed. “Sustained by faith in the principles of liberty, and the value of a free society, this position comes with unparalleled responsibilities, obligations, and opportunity. The great strength of this nation must be used to promote a balance of power that favors freedom.” But less than five years later, that vision appears to be in full strategic retreat.

The U.S.-Australia alliance is one of the cornerstones of American regional security strategy in East Asia. Years of work by successive administrations in Washington and Canberra have forged both trust and synergy in the two nations’ strategic objectives. Of course, no two countries share identical interests. But perhaps more then any other bilateral relationship in East Asia, America’s partnership with Australia is rooted in common values and a common vision for the region.

Nearly five years after September 11, it is fair to say that the U.S. government remains challenged by how to combat the ideology of radical Islamists. In some ways, this is not surprising. The West now faces a challenge in an area - religious controversy - which the modern state prefers to leave to individual discretion, and in which it is not accustomed to contend. Moreover, the struggle is taking place within a largely unfamiliar religion, in an area in which the West is, at best, tone-deaf. Nevertheless, this new “war of ideas” must be joined and won if the United States is to address what have become grave threats to its security.

This spring, practically unnoticed by the mainstream media, the battle lines were formally drawn in the “war of ideas.” President George W. Bush used his January 2005 inaugural address to deliver an unapologetic tribute to freedom and the premises that undergird Western liberalism: liberty, the individual, and self-government.In response, Jordanian terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, Osama Bin Laden’s chief lieutenant in Iraq, released an audiotape of his own. In it, he denounced the very principles President Bush has pledged to promote.This frank exchange should serve as a useful primer for all of those who believe that the War on Terror is at its core a struggle against global privation, or a cross-cultural misunderstanding that can be settled by a search for common ground. Quite the opposite is true. We are engaged in an ideological conflict that resists compromise.

The battle for Iraq may still be far from over, but its impact is already sending shockwaves throughout the Middle East. Militarily, Washington's early successes have put to rest any lingering doubts about U.S. capabilities or American resolve. But more significant still is the example set by Iraq's impending liberation, and the accompanying realization that is taking root in the region — that Baghdad's fall could foreshadow even greater change.

A silver lining in the trans-Atlantic storm clouds over Iraq is the damage done to NATO. This costly foreign entanglement was long overdue for a body blow. NATO was not intended, by Americans at least, to be a permanent commitment, but an interim measure while Western Europe recovered from the War. When the first Supreme Allied Commander, Dwight Eisenhower, obtained congressional consent to station U.S. divisions in Europe, he promised and believed they would be there only a few years. But, like Marx's "withering away of the state," Europe proved resilient in allowing America to shoulder Europe's burden long after its prosperity dwarfed the laggard socialist economies and even after the Soviet collapse. The European Union today integrates everything except defense, lest it make too obvious that Europe is more than able to look after itself.

Even as it girds for war in the Persian Gulf, the Bush Administration faces a major challenge in East Asia – that of a nuclear North Korea. The conflict emerged quite suddenly. Back in October, Pyongyang stunned the White House with its unexpected admission of an active clandestine nuclear program. The disclosure was followed, in rapid succession, by the DPRK’s December decision to restart its Yongbyon nuclear facility and expel International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors. A month later, North Korea abruptly withdrew from the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and rolled back its self-imposed 1999 moratorium on missile testing. Together, these moves have presented Washington with an unprecedented – and escalating – problem on the Korean Peninsula.

What a difference a year makes. Twelve months ago, the coalition government of Bulent Ecevit in Turkey had risen to the forefront of U.S. regional allies in the Middle East, contributing heavily to America's Afghan campaign. Today, Washington is deadlocked with Ankara, now led by the Justice and Development Party (AKP), over the next phase in its war on terrorism: military action against Iraq.