[Editor’s Note: The CRM #740, Special Issue: Taiwan’s Military Defense, summarized the December 25, 2008 article "Seven Unique Characteristics in the Development of Taiwanese Military Affairs” featured in the Hong Kong-based Ta Kung Pao newspaper. That report examined Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou’s policies to modernize Taiwan's military force amid his parallel efforts to cultivate a “diplomatic truce” with Beijing. Below is a comparable summary of an article published on February 1st in Qiushi Magazine by Jing Zhiyuan and Peng Xiaofeng entitled "Building Strategic Missile Unit with Chinese Characteristics." In this article the authors describe “core” elements of China’s national defense strategy, with regards to its strategic missile arsenal.]
“Strategic Ideology”
The PLA’s efforts at “defending national security and protecting world peace” have been supported by each generation of China’s political leadership. Deng Xiaoping began China’s strategic thinking about missile technology development. The article quotes Jiang Zemin as saying the PLA must "strengthen strategic missile unit building, defend the security of the homeland, and protect world peace." Under Jiang the PLA paid increased “attention to nuclear and conventional missiles,” while under Hu Jintao the PLA has built “an informatised strategic missile unit with Chinese characteristics.”
“Talent-building”
The PLA’s “talent-building and scientific research work achievements have been abundant.” Of PLA cadres 78.2 percent have an education level of bachelor's degree or above and “scientific and technological cadre” now make up about half of all PLA cadres. The military trains science and technology experts at their Chinese Academy of Engineering [CAE] including a “technical talent team” made up of “the best of the best” missile technology experts and technicians, to build “a technology backbone” for the PLA.
“Keeping Secrets”
Security is a top priority for the PLA and it has “put great efforts into strengthening security building to ensure the absolute security of operational positions, missile weapons and equipment.” The authors also warn cadres that “while implementing specific practices,” it is critical to “keep secrets and not talk about the party's internal business publicly.”
“Force Building”
The PLA has held “a series of missile firings and significant military exercises” and advanced “from the operational model of fixed position operations to mobile operations, and from the operational capability of close, medium, and long-range to intercontinental strikes.” The PLA has “taken the initial steps in forming a military force system that gives equal attention to nuclear and conventional missiles” with “a notably-strengthened destructive force.” The article also calls for the “accelerated” development of “nuclear and conventional missile operational forces that are suited to national security and the development of interests, and the requirements for winning informatised wars.”
“Strategic Objectives”
The article posits several reasons for the four-pronged approach described above, most notably “the strategic support and firm backing for national security and development.” Specifically, the PLA’s objectives include, “firm defense of national sovereignty and security and resolute protection of a peaceful development environment to powerfully support China's politics and diplomacy.” China’s efforts “to build an elite and effective nuclear and conventional missile operational force” are intended, as Deng suggested, to help the country “attain a higher position and more say in the new world order of the future.”
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