Global Islamism Monitor No. 113

GOVERNANCE PAINS IN AFGHANISTAN
Ever since it swept back to power in Kabul nearly three years ago, the austere Taliban movement has set about reimposing its draconian version of Islamic law on Afghanistan's captive population. While some features of Taliban rule – for instance, its ban on female education – have received widespread coverage and condemnation, others have garnered less attention. Nevertheless, a range of Taliban policies are fueling growing grassroots discontent – and at least some of this anger has begun spilling out into the open.

Take the group's approach to opium cultivation. Over the past several weeks, popular protests in the country's northern Badakhshan province resulted in at least two deaths. At issue is a Taliban edict authorizing the eradication of opium poppy crops – which accounts for most of the province's agricultural output. Taliban officials have been dispatched to the region for consultations in a bid to quell the civil unrest. (Reuters, May 7, 2024)

[EDITOR'S NOTE: The Badakhshan turmoil represents a microcosm of a larger issue. According to research firm Alcis, poppy production in Afghanistan has seen a drastic reduction in recent years, constricting by more than 90% in some provinces following a 2022 ban on narcotics cultivation by the Taliban leadership. That, in turn, has had concrete economic effects for many Afghans, who previously relied on opium cultivation and farming for their livelihood.]

MALI MAKES COUNTERTERRORISM PROGRESS
Islamic extremism is expanding in Africa's unruly Sahel region, but at least one nation is charting some gains in its fight against it. In a recent large-scale operation in Mali's northern region of Menaka, the country's security forces successfully killed Abu Huzeifa, a senior commander of the Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP). Huzeifa played a role in a 2017 attack on Niger that killed four U.S. and four Nigerien soldiers, and the U.S. State Department subsequently placed a $5 million bounty on his head via its Rewards for Justice program. (Reuters, April 29, 2024)

RECONFIGURING AL-HOL... AND THE IRAQI ROLE
In its fight against the Islamic State last decade, the 82-member Global Coalition relied extensively on detention camps and refugee emplacements to accommodate individuals displaced from the group's self-declared caliphate in Iraq and Syria. Perhaps the most notorious of these is al-Hol, a refugee camp situated near the Iraqi-Syrian border. Although originally intended as a temporary waypoint for the families of ISIS members, the facility has proven long-lasting, in large part because foreign nations have struggled to formulate their respective approaches to dealing with citizens who joined the Islamic State. Meanwhile, worries have abounded that the camp could become a breeding ground for a future generation of jihadists. (See Global Islamism Monitor No. 94).

The scope of the problem is huge. Al-Hol currently houses 42,781 people, the overwhelming majority of them either Iraqi or Syrian. However, more than 6,000 of its residents are foreigners hailing from 57 other countries. Security for the camp is provided by the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), who have long struggled to maintain order in the facility. As a result, the SDF has been actively pressing foreign nations with citizens in the camp to take custody and repatriate them.

And at least some are doing so. Earlier this month, nearly 700 Iraqis, the majority of them women and children, were moved from al-Hol to a rehabilitation program as part of "an effort to distance them from extremist ideology." The move, Iraqi officials say, is essential, because "leaving them at al-Hol camp means they are a time bomb that could threaten Iraq's security." The recent returnees, moreover, are part of a substantially larger cohort; since the defeat of ISIS in 2019, Iraq has repatriated more than 7,500 citizens from al-Hol. (Associated Press, April 29, 2024)