Indo-Pacific Monitor No. 55

TOKYO, JAKARTA TIGHTEN TIES...
Indonesia and Japan have formalized a security agreement that will expand defense cooperation in joint training exercises and the procurement of Japanese military equipment. Japanese Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi met with his Indonesian counterpart, Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin, who emphasized the growing importance of defense ties between the two nations. Koizumi highlighted the similarities between Japan and Indonesia in both their maritime geography and cultural values, stressing that the enhanced cooperation would better anchor regional security as tensions continue across the Indo-Pacific.

Under its current President, Probowo Subianto, Indonesia has accelerated military modernization with initiatives to expand its compliment of fighter jets, along with the signing of new defense agreements with countries like the United States and Australia. At the same time, Jakarta has been prudent in diversifying its defense partnerships, also developing relations with China and Russia. For Tokyo, meanwhile, the agreement reflects another step in a pivot toward a more active Japanese role in regional security partnerships, following the Japanese government's recent amendment of its longstanding prohibition on exporting military hardware. (The Diplomat, May 5, 2026)

...AS RUSSIA AND INDIA MOVE AHEAD WITH RELOS PACT
Meanwhile, India and Russia are expanding their defense contacts as well. The two countries have announced the implementation of the Details of the Reciprocal Exchange of Logistics Support (RELOS) pact, an unprecedented agreement that for the first time will permit Indian and Russian forces to deploy up to 3,000 troops on each other's territory. The arrangement grants shared access to bases, ports, and airfields while permitting each side to station up to five warships and ten military aircraft there at a time. Beyond the deployment of personnel, the RELOS agreement significantly expands logistical cooperation by air and sea.

Analysts note that the pact is tactical in nature, and stops short of establishing a formal military alliance. Nevertheless, it provides concrete benefits for both parties. For India, the agreement strengthens access to Russian energy and transportation networks while providing additional flexibility for military transit. Meanwhile, Russia stands to gain broader access to Asian markets and infrastructure – something that Moscow sorely needs to successfully adapt to the economic and diplomatic isolation that has resulted from its war on Ukraine. (Nikkei Asia, May 5, 2026; Al Jazeera, April 24, 2026)

BEIJING AND DELHI DIAL IT DOWN
New Delhi has gradually been rekindling its diplomatic ties with Beijing since border clashes in 2020 almost brought the two Asian giants to open war. Since the 2024 resolution of that conflict, a series of exchanges have taken place between Indian Premier Narendra Modi and China's Xi Jinping – including at the 2024 BRICS and 2025 Shanghai Cooperation summits – laying the groundwork for a broader thaw in relations. It is anticipated that Xi will reciprocate these overtures when India hosts the BRICS Summit in September.

Beneath the diplomatic contacts, however, lies a more pragmatic calculus. Despite continued disagreements over the Line of Actual Control, Tibet, and India's interactions with Taiwan, both countries appear increasingly willing to compartmentalize political disputes in favor of economic cooperation. A more aggressive U.S. foreign policy and strained supply chains amid the war with Iran and the ongoing blockade of the Strait of Hormuz have also pressured New Delhi to prioritize economic prosperity over strategic aims. (East Asia Forum, May 25, 2026)

SEOUL DIVING FOR DETERRENCE
In an effort to develop maritime deterrence into the first island chain, South Korea has declared that it will invest in the production of nuclear-powered submarines. The proposed subs are projected to be fully serviceable by the late 2030s, with a 30-year lifespan utilizing low-enriched uranium as a power supply. The initiative reflects growing interest in undersea warfare capabilities throughout the Indo-Pacific. While North Korea remains Seoul's primary security concern, the program would also expand South Korea's ability to operate across the waters of the first island chain, balancing China's expanding submarine program as well as enhancing Seoul's ability to monitor regional maritime activity. (South China Morning Post, May 29, 2026)