THE UKRAINE WAR'S CRIMINAL ALUMNI
As part of his ongoing war against Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin has taken a number of steps to beef up his military's ranks - including dipping into the country's criminal population, offering amnesties and pardons in exchange for service in the armed forces. That practice is now having pronounced – and destabilizing – effects within Russia itself. As Paul Goble notes, criminologists trace the upsurge of domestic instability that has taken place within Russia over the past year, at least in part, to the "return to their home areas of Russian veterans who unlike in past wars have kept together while fighting."
Writing in his Window on Eurasia blog, Goble notes that, according to investigative journalists like Igor Trifomov, many in this cohort "are coming back with more weapons than was true after [the wars in] Afghanistan and Chechnya" but also "have served together and returned together." The effect of this trend is that "many of these individuals feel themselves beyond the reach of the authorities because they have now formed organized criminal groups that draw both on their experiences in Ukraine and their earlier experiences in such groups before going to fight in Putin's war." (Window on Eurasia, January 15, 2025)
NOW, REHABILITATING HTS
It wasn't that long ago that Russia counted itself as a stalwart foe of al-Qaeda. But now that the group's onetime affiliate, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), has swept to power in Damascus by unseating longtime Russian ally Bashar al-Assad, the Kremlin is singing a different tune. In mid-February, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov spoke by phone with interim Syrian leader (and HTS head) Ahmed al-Sharaa as part of what appears to be a larger thaw in Moscow's position. Russian sources have revealed that the Kremlin plans to hold more extensive in-person talks with Syria's new leadership in the near future. (Reuters, February 19, 2025)
[EDITORS' NOTE: The overtures are pragmatic. Over the past several years, thanks to its support for the Assad regime, Russia had managed to ensconce itself in the Middle East, using Syria as a springboard for a broader regional presence. This included the establishment of two key military outposts on Syrian soil. Now that the Assad regime is no longer in power, however, the fate of these bases is uncertain – and Russia's government is scrambling to maintain its foothold in the country, including by taking a softer tack toward its new Islamist rulers.]
DUGIN'S NEW FOCUS: REFASHIONING ACADEMIA
In recent years, Alexander Dugin has distinguished himself as Russia's most prominent, and controversial, political philosopher, emphasizing Russia's Eurasian distinctness and arguing about the inevitability of renewed empire. Indeed, since the start of the Ukraine conflict three years ago, Dugin has been a prominent presence in the Russian media, agitating in favor of the need to conquer Ukraine as an indispensable part of Novorossiya (New Russia). Now, Dugin is turning his attention – and his ideology – to a target closer to home. Meduza reports that the philosopher "wants to change how political science is taught across the humanities in Russian higher education." In particular, Dugin – from his current academic perch at the Ivan Ilyin Higher Political School at the Russian State University for the Humanities – has formulated a packet of materials designed to eradicate "Americacentrism" from the way political science is taught in Russia.
"The existing model of political science education is not only outdated and irrelevant but harmful, shaping dangerous and hostile attitudes in students that contradict Russian civilization and Russian culture," Dugin’s materials lay out. To counter this trend, he argues, "political science should instead 'strengthen civic-mindedness' in Russia and instill patriotism in students." This entails "the prioritization of state life and public life over private life, as well as the subordination of individual interests to the values and interests of the Fatherland, and of private benefit to the common good."
Dugin's proposed lesson plan, which has been presented to Russia's Education Ministry, instead directs instructors to emphasize the "concept of Orthodoxy, autocracy, and nationality" as the historical foundation of the Russian state. It also takes a distinctly Russia-centric view of history and national greatness, arguing that "the Russian Tsardom was the direct political successor of the Byzantine (Roman) Empire." (Meduza, February 25, 2025)
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