Publications

For the moment, Muhammad Ibrahim Makawi is still far from a household name. Outside of a small corpus of terrorism experts and national security specialists, few people are familiar with the Egyptian-born militant who is arguably al-Qaeda’s most dangerous operative. But they should be. Mounting evidence suggests that, after years of absence, Makawi—better known by his nom de guerre, Saif al-Adel (“sword of justice” in Arabic)—is back in action and spearheading a new stage in al-Qaeda’s war with the West.

It’s a tried-and-true tenet of warfare, showcased throughout centuries of combat, that it is a great deal easier to attack than to defend. Attacking forces have the luxury of setting the time, the place and the means by which conflict is joined, while defenders are forced to anticipate the actions and objectives of their adversaries—or suffer the consequences.

In the age of modern terrorism, those consequences could mean another 9/11, or worse. And while the United States has fared better than most in thwarting these kind of attacks (the Heritage Foundation estimates that the U.S. government has successfully foiled over 30 significant terrorist plots since September 2001), talk to any counterterrorism professional and you’ll come away with the impression that America, like its allies abroad, is still very much playing defense.

Last week, Iran rolled out the red carpet for an unlikely dignitary. The visitor wasn’t Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, the spiritual head of the Hezbollah Shi’ite militia Iran created in Lebanon in the early 1980s and has sustained since. Nor was it Nouri al-Maliki, Iraq’s newly-reconfirmed prime minister, whom—having failed to supplant in favor of a more pliable politician in recent elections—Tehran is now actively courting. Rather, the head-of-state that garnered Tehran’s most lavish diplomatic reception was none other than Venezuelan strongman Hugo Chavez, who over the past decade has emerged as one of Iran’s most dependable international allies.

For quite a while now, policymakers in Washington have worked diligently to try and test a simple hypothesis: that energy sanctions can help derail Iran’s march toward the bomb.

Over the years, this effort has taken the form of a number of legislative initiatives aimed at curtailing Tehran’s energy trade with the world. Of late, however, American pressure has honed in on Iran’s most glaring economic dependency, its deep reliance on foreign refined petroleum. The culmination was the passage by Congress this summer of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability and Divestment Act, a sweeping set of new provisions aimed in large measure at throttling the Iranian regime’s oil sector.

Can sanctions stop Iran's nuclear drive? Since the passage of new U.S. and multilateral measures this summer, there have been unmistakable signs that Iran has begun to feel the economic pinch. Prompted by mounting international pressure, a slew of foreign multinationals have exited the Iranian market, while a range of countries - from South Korea to the United Arab Emirates - are in the process of curtailing their financial dealings with the Islamic republic.

But, despite these heartening signs, the ultimate success of sanctions depends on what could come after. In order for economic pressure to be taken seriously in Tehran, Iran's leaders must be convinced that their continued intransigence on the nuclear front will lead to something far worse.

For the moment, at least, they clearly are not. That is in large part because, despite repeated assurances from U.S. officials that "all options remain on the table" in dealing with the Iranian regime, Tehran has been permitted to wage not one but two irregular wars against America for more than half a decade and to do so with virtual impunity.