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If economic sanctions fail to stop Iran's march toward the bomb, and either the U.S. or Israel is compelled to use force against the Iranian nuclear program, China will shoulder at least some of the blame.

Since this summer, concerted international pressure has unmistakably tightened the financial noose around Iran's ayatollahs. The June passage of a new round of United Nations sanctions against the Islamic Republic has been followed by an exodus of European and Asian firms from the Iranian market, and new, stricter regulations on financial dealings with the regime in Tehran. Simultaneously, unilateral American sanctions have honed in on Iran's most glaring economic vulnerability—its deep dependence on supplies of refined petroleum from abroad—with marked results. According to energy consultancy EMC, Iran's gasoline imports plummeted by 50 percent, from 120,000 to 60,000 barrels per day, in the month after the imposition of U.S. sanctions, as skittish foreign suppliers scrambled to exit the Iranian market.

But the push to isolate Iran economically may end up being undermined by a key global actor. China's leaders may have reluctantly gone along with the latest round of Security Council sanctions passed this summer. Yet, even as other foreign stakeholders have constricted their financial stakes in Iran, Beijing has done the opposite.

The furor accompanying the recent dissemination of classified military files by WikiLeaks has focused some much-needed attention on the damaging role Pakistan plays in the Afghan theater. As the WikiLeaks documents highlight in damning detail, Islamabad's close - and ongoing - cooperation with the Taliban has made it a key accessory to the worsening insurgency against the U.S.-led coalition on the war on terror's first front.

But what can actually be done about Islamabad's double-dealing? Disengagement, after all, is simply not an option. By dint of its strategic geography, Pakistan is a key player in Afghanistan, and its constructive involvement is essential to ensuring lasting stability there - especially following the planned July 2011 U.S. withdrawal. Pakistan is also a nuclear power, and the specter of Islamists gaining control of its burgeoning atomic arsenal is a nightmare scenario the West has sought to forestall through increased diplomatic engagement and foreign aid.

For years, Pakistan has played on these fears to get a pass on its domestic conduct and keep American dollars flowing. But this does not mean the United States lacks the ability to steer Pakistan toward a more constructive course. To the contrary, a number of opportunities exist for Washington to influence Islamabad's stance on terrorism and radical Islam.

If the Kremlin stays true to its word, Russia on Saturday will begin loading nuclear fuel into Iran's Bushehr reactor. Once it does, it will usher in a new stage in the deepening crisis over Iran's nuclear program.

The 1,000-megawatt plutonium reactor, located near the southern Iranian port city of the same name, has been the public face of the Iranian regime's nuclear program since Tehran and Moscow concluded the agreement to build it, despite American objections, in early 1995. Construction was completed in 2004, but Bushehr has laid dormant for years, ostensibly because of disputes over financing between Russia and Iran, but really because of Moscow's recognition of Washington's worries about Iran's nuclear program.

What do you call an ally that tries to kill you? That's the question most Americans are asking in the wake of last month's dissemination by Internet clearinghouse WikiLeaks of some 92,000 classified U.S. military documents relating to the war in Afghanistan. The files provide a sobering portrait of the true state of play on the War on Terror's first front. Far and away the most damaging disclosures, however, are those relating to the pernicious role being played by Pakistan, long regarded as a critical American ally in South Asia, in supporting and sustaining the anti-Western insurgency there.

Long-time observers of American politics know that in order to truly put your finger on the pulse of the nation, you have to watch Wall Street. Savvy Iran-watchers will tell you that to do the same in the Islamic republic, you need to keep your eye on the bazaar.

Iran's sprawling marketplaces are more than simply centers of commerce. They are home to a powerful class of merchants who historically have served as key power brokers in the country's labyrinthine political system. Indeed, as the renowned historian Walter Laqueur astutely pointed out in the wake of the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the shah's loss of support among the country's shopkeepers and merchants was an important part of why Ruhollah Khomeini's clerical takeover ultimately succeeded. Simply put, Iran's businessmen no longer felt invested in the old, secular status quo. The rest, as they say, is history.