Russia Policy Monitor No. 2664

Related Categories: Economic Sanctions; International Economics and Trade; Middle East; Libya; Russia; Ukraine

HE GRIM TOLL OF PUTIN'S WAR
Ukraine's General Staff recently reported that Russia is losing approximately 1,650 soldiers a day in the current war, bringing total casualties suffered by the Russian Federation to date to 828,470. In addition, Kyiv claims that Russian military losses include nearly 9,859 tanks, over 20,500 armored vehicles, more than 22,300 artillery systems, and thousands of drones and missiles. (The New Voice of Ukraine, January 25, 2025)

MOSCOW THINKS BEYOND DAMASCUS
For decades, the Kremlin served as a key strategic partner for the Assad regime in Damascus, first during the tenure of Hafez al-Assad (who took power in 1971) and subsequently during that of his son, Bashar (who assumed office in 2000). Over the past several years, this has included providing extensive military assistance to Assad against assorted opposition forces arrayed against his regime. In return, Russia succeeded in securing an extensive military presence in the Middle Eastern state. When Assad's regime fell suddenly in December, Kremlin officials scrambled to secure their position in the country. But as the weeks wear on, it's clear that Russia's foothold in post-Assad Syria is diminishing.

While contacts between Moscow and the new leadership in Damascus remain underway, "the new regime in Damascus has many reasons to reconsider its cooperation with Russia and reject Moscow's request to maintain its military forces in the country," notes Georgy Poroskoun in an analysis for Israel's Institute for National Strategic Studies. "For the rebel forces, memories of Russian airstrikes are still fresh, and they may find it difficult to justify to themselves and to the Syrian people why those same Russian forces are allowed to remain on Syrian soil. In addition, the new Syrian leader and his temporary government are making every effort to portray themselves as moderate actors, thereby gaining the trust and support of the West" – something that would make continued partnership with Russia both "counterproductive and detrimental."

Moscow understands these realities, and is adapting accordingly. "Russia is removing significant amounts of military equipment from Syria, evidenced by a marked increase in the number of large cargo flights at the Khmeimim Air Base and the movement of various military and civilian maritime vessels capable of carrying heavy loads that departed from Russian ports in northern Europe and headed toward Tartus," writes Poroskoun. "Reports suggest that even the strategic S-400 aerial defense systems — a critical element of Russia's presence in Syria... may have been removed and redeployed to Libya." (INSS, January 25, 2025)

MORE SIGNS OF ECONOMIC FRAGILITY
Russian President Vladimir Putin is reportedly increasingly concerned about the state of his country's wartime economy. Despite rapid economic growth in 2023 and 2024, recent months have seen domestic tensions due to labor shortages, high interest rates, inflation, and record defense spending. Inflation has neared 10% despite Russia's Central Bank raising its base interest rate to 21% in October. International financial institutions now project that Russia will see only nominal growth in 2025.

All this has the potential to alter, at long last, the Russian government's calculus vis-a-vis Ukraine. Two sources close to the Kremlin have said that Putin may be close to considering negotiations to end the war, and one stated that the Russian president believes "the main goals of the war have already been achieved." Other Russian officials have signaled the same, with Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov suggesting there is a "small window of opportunity" for an agreement to end the conflict. (The New Voice of Ukraine, January 23, 2025)

HOW IS RUSSIA'S RECRUITMENT DRIVE REALLY GOING?
Dmitry Medvedev, the Deputy Chairman of Russia's Security Council, recently announced on social media that approximately 450,000 individuals signed contracts to serve in the Russian army last year. Additionally, over 40,000 people joined volunteer brigades to fight in Ukraine. The goal, Medvedev laid out, is to repeat those figures in 2025. (Reuters, January 24, 2025)

[EDITORS’ NOTE: On the surface, the figures cited by Medvedev indeed appear rosy. However, the Kremlin continues to experience significant manpower shortfalls in its Ukraine war effort, and has increasingly resorted to foreign (including North Korean) manpower to compensate for heavy battlefield losses. Moreover, a surge of the sort envisioned by Medvedev remains unlikely absent a new conscription drive by the Kremlin – something that could result in dramatic domestic discontent and political turmoil for Putin's government.]