Russia Is Settling In for a War of Attrition
Ever since it launched its "special military operation" against Kyiv last year, global publics have wondered just how long Moscow can keep up its war of aggression.
Ever since it launched its "special military operation" against Kyiv last year, global publics have wondered just how long Moscow can keep up its war of aggression.
“[T]he basis of [U.S.] support” for Israel, longtime U.S. diplomat and Israel watcher Dennis Ross wrote back in 2015, “is driven by the perception of Israel as a country that shares America’s values... The last thing Israel needs now is to have its basic democratic character called into question.”
Russia’s plan, clearly, is to raise the specter of food shortages (and political instability) as a way to turn world opinion against Ukraine, and to force Western nations to scale back their own campaign of pressure.
Last year, more than a million people left Russia, marking what is likely the largest yearly emigration in recorded history... There are real and tangible threats which require sustained attention from the national security apparats of countries that are hosting Russian migrants now or will do so in the future.
With NATO’s latest gathering this week in Vilnius, Washington is understandably focused on what the United States and its allies should do next to help Ukraine rebuff Russia. Moscow’s invasion, however, is part of a larger, multi-nation challenge to which Washington has not yet developed a comprehensive response.
That challenge is the axis of deepening diplomatic, military, and economic cooperation between China, Russia, and Iran. Washington is responding to individual provocations in ways that seem to contradict one another.
[T]he long-term consequences of Prighozin’s power play are liable to be profound. Here are a trio of what could be the most consequential for Russian foreign policy — and for Western nations now marshalling a response to its aggression, both in Europe and beyond.
These are heady days for Turkey's president. Last month, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the country's larger-than-life strongman, eked out an electoral win over opposition rival Kemal Kilicdaroglu to secure a third five-year term in office. In the process, he dashed the hopes of many in the West for a more democratic turn on the part of NATO's only Middle Eastern member.
Central Asians have no intention to roll back their ties with their large neighbors, but seek rather to balance them with ties with the West... America now has before it what may be the last, best chance to prevent the region from being dominated by autocratic outsiders.
With Washington resuming indirect talks with Tehran over its nuclear program, opponents of the 2015 nuclear deal in the United States and abroad are raising legitimate fears that Washington will provide the Islamic Republic with sanctions relief while getting little, if anything, in return. And who can blame them?
How can Delhi continue to grow in a changing global environment? The answer is closer partnership with Washington.
In his efforts to revive a Russian empire, Mr. Putin may have decisively doomed his country’s chances of ever being one again. For that, Russia’s president has no one but himself to blame.
To be sure, our leaders must engage not just with democratic allies but with autocrats in Beijing, Moscow, Tehran, and elsewhere. Presidents are wise to seek meetings in which to enunciate our values, delineate our priorities, glean what we can from our adversaries, and seek cooperation when possible.
In some respects, the diplomatic peace offensive is as important as the Ukrainian ground offensive, because conflict termination will ultimately come from the bargaining table and not the battlefield. This phase of the conflict is critical.
Last month, China’s special representative for Eurasian affairs, Li Hui, visited Kyiv, Warsaw, Berlin, Paris, and Brussels with “a clear message”: European governments should view Beijing as an alternative to Washington, and recognize Ukrainian territories seized by Moscow as belonging to Russia in order to quickly end the war.
Nearly a year-and-a-half into Russia’s “special military operation” against its western neighbor, its next-generation arms have failed to materialize in any meaningful way.
CACI chairman S. Frederick Starr discusses the resurgence of Imperial Russia with the American Purpose magazine
Between mid-March and mid-April, Israel's northern frontier experienced its worst spasm of instability in over a decade-and-a-half. On March 13, an armed extremist connected to Hezbollah infiltrated the country and blew up a car at the Megiddo junction, some 50 miles south of the Israeli-Lebanese border. Three weeks later, over the Passover holiday, the Hamas terrorist group launched a salvo of 36 rockets from Lebanese territory against towns and civilian populations in the western Galilee, wounding several and damaging local infrastructure. Two days after that, rockets were launched at Israel from Syria as well.
Engaged in high-stakes political drama, Washington’s playmakers can forget that the world watches their every move—with our allies looking for leadership and growing concerned that we may no longer have the wherewithal to provide it, and our adversaries savoring our domestic turmoil.
This state of affairs makes a collapse of the current ruling coalition a distinct possibility.