Russia Policy Monitor No. 2636

MOSCOW'S YOUNGEST VICTIMS
Ukrainian campaigners have accused Russia of abducting about 20,000 children as part of its efforts to erase Ukraine's future, causing deep psychological scars in the process. The activists argue that the Kremlin’s actions constitute a war crime and genocide under international law. Russia, for its part, has argued that it is safeguarding vulnerable children from war zones. Mykola Kuleba, founder of Save Ukraine, criticized Russia's strategy of deception and indoctrination at a recent international summit in Switzerland, sharing stories of children that were forced to abandon their Ukrainian identity. Save Ukraine has successfully repatriated 373 children from Russia to date, with many showing symptoms of deep trauma. Kuleba called for international efforts to track and return the abducted children, some of whom have been listed for adoption online. (Reuters, June 15, 2024)

KAKHOVKA, A YEAR ON
On July 6, 2023, Russia bombed the Kakhovka dam and hydroelectric power plant (HPP), causing immense flooding that devastated surrounding towns and villages. In addition to the short-term consequences, there have been surprising long-term effects for the Ukrainian regions of Kherson, Mykolaiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Zaporizhia, The Economist reports. Because these regions (which contain 25% of Ukraine’s farmland) relied on the reservoir for irrigation, agriculture has been particularly affected. Moreover, many of the affected fields have been mined by the retreating Russian military, so the danger of mines coupled with lack of water has caused many people to simply abandon their land. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky declared that the bombing constitutes "ecocide," because the flooding damaged nearly half a million hectares of land and led to the flow of sewage and other pollutants into the Black Sea. 

While some scientists, citing the surprising recovery undergone by the region, have argued the reservoir should not be reconstituted, energy experts disagree. Oleksandr Kharchenko, an advisor at a Kyiv energy think tank, believes that there is "no alternative" to rebuilding the dam and HPP because hydropower capacity is necessary for Ukraine, both in order to restore energy after Russian attacks on the national power grid as well as for the country's larger clean energy transition. Reconstruction efforts, however, are currently hampered by the ongoing conflict with Russia, as well as by the prohibitive costs involved. (The Economist, June 5, 2024)

RUSSIAN LEADERSHIP: ALL IN THE FAMILY
Since his dismissal of Sergei Shoigu as Defense Minister back in May, Russian President Vladimir Putin has embarked on a campaign to tighten control over the country's Ministry of Defense – and relying on nepotism to do it. Putin dismissed four deputy ministers of defense in mid-June, replacing them with more dependable alternatives, one of whom happens to be his own niece, Anna Tsivileva. Tsivileva is the owner of a major coal company, Kolmar, which relocated from Switzerland to Dubai in August 2022 in order to evade restrictions on the export of Russian coal associated with the Kremlin's war in Ukraine. She also heads the Defenders of the Fatherland Foundation, an organization created by Putin to support Russian soldiers in the war which has received over $10 billion rubles (more than $113 million) in donations since its inception. Nor is Tsivileva alone. Her husband, Sergey Tsivilyev, has been tapped to be the country's new Minister of Energy. (The Insider, June 17, 2024)

MOSCOW, PYONGYANG MAKE COMMON CAUSE
In mid-June, Putin arrived in Pyongyang for the first time in nearly a quarter-century in order to meet with North Korean leader Kim Jung-Un. The state visit netted a new mutual defense treaty, in which each pledged to offer the other assistance in the event of acts of foreign aggression. The nature of the assistance remains unclear; Putin did not clarify whether the new pact would require immediate military assistance, like the 1961 defense pact concluded between the Soviet Union and North Korea. He did, however, note that Russia "does not exclude the development of military-technical cooperation" with North Korea.

The development represents a notable reversal. In the past, Russia has gone along with U.S. efforts to impose sanctions on North Korea for its nuclear weapons development. Since the start of the Ukraine war, however, the DPRK has emerged as an increasingly vital ally for the Russian war effort, and Kremlin policy has changed accordingly. A few weeks prior to Putin's visit, Russia used its UN Security Council veto to dissolve a panel of experts working to implement sanctions on North Korea. (New York Times, June 19, 2024)

RUSSIAN NUCLEAR POWER TRANSLATES TO GLOBAL INFLUENCE
In the past, oil and gas served as the Kremlin's main tools of influence to sway global publics and shape Western politics – a trend best exemplified by projects like the controversial (and now moribund) Nord Stream 2 pipeline to bring natural gas to Europe. Since the start of the Ukraine war some two-and-a-half years ago, Western sanctions have targeted Russian energy exports and significantly hampered Moscow's ability to wield energy influence. As a result, Russia has increasingly come to rely on a new type of energy influence: nuclear technology. Prior to the current war, Russia was already a world leader in the nuclear energy sector, accounting for half of all international agreements on the construction of nuclear power plants. Moreover, sanctions have not slowed this trend appreciably; Russia is currently involved with a third of new reactors being constructed worldwide, in countries like China, India, Iran and Egypt.

Moscow's nuclear diplomacy relies on a build-buy-own model, with the resulting power plant owned and operated by Russia. According to Kacper Szulecki of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, "The Russian side treats the plants as if [they are] owned by ROSATOM [Russia's state nuclear agency]. The only role of the host country is to buy the electricity from the reactor." Utilizing this model, ROSATOM can offer up to ninety percent financing with repayments spread over decades at minimal interest rates for nuclear projects – terms extremely appealing to poorer nations, such as Bangladesh, which recently began construction of its first nuclear power plant. But such a partnership creates a dependency on Russia that worries both Bangladeshi civil society and Western countries, who worry that – without Western leadership – safeguards around nuclear security, nonproliferation and safety standards will erode. (Financial Times, June 20, 2024)