Policy Papers

Reusable rockets have drastically slashed the cost to reach orbit, but despite this capability nearly every U.S. satellite is still built to be used once and then abandoned. The U.S. should now focus on developing recoverable and reusable satellites to enhance American space resilience doctrine, reduce orbital debris, and increase defense-supply chain security. Particularly as our adversaries, like China, are already moving in that direction. Six recommendations for Congress and the Department of War (DoW) are outlined below, several of which align with the White House's new National Space Transportation Policy (NSPM-17, signed August 20, 2026).

In a manner reminiscent of the first Cold War, Washington and Beijing are now competing to entice smaller countries to their side. “China and the U.S. each represent one pole, with many ‘middle countries’ in between,” observes Shi Yuanhua of Fudan University. “Middle countries represent key targets for China’s diplomacy and competition with the U.S.” 

On February 28, 2026, Iranian authorities cut all internet access, plunging Iran into what became an 88-day nationwide blackout—the longest in modern history. What does this shutdown reveal about the Islamic Republic's increasingly sophisticated censorship regime, and what lessons can we apply to strengthen existing and new circumvention tools to keep Iranians online the next time Tehran moves to disconnect them?

The United States faces a fundamental organizational crisis in space. America’s space enterprise remains fragmented across multiple agencies with unclear roles, overlapping responsibilities, and competing authorities. This institutional confusion undermines national security, stifles commercial innovation, and threatens U.S. leadership in the vital space domain.

Although Tehran’s activities in Africa tend to receive far less attention than its machinations in the Middle East, Europe, or Latin America, they form a critical pillar of the Islamic Republic’s global strategy.