On November 28, 2024, the ruling Georgian Dream (GD) party explicitly announced a change in Georgia's foreign policy trajectory, despite overwhelming public opposition to turning away from European integration.
As Georgia approaches parliamentary elections in October 2024, the South Caucasus state stands at a pivotal juncture.
When the second Trump administration takes office next month, it will face a thoroughly crowded Mideast agenda. Near-term priorities for the new White House include helping Israel to wind down its war in Gaza, resuscitating the Abraham Accords, and reviving a policy of "maximum pressure" against Iran. But arguably the most pressing item confronting Team Trump will be changing the status quo in the Red Sea.
Western observers are neglecting important developments: Judging by what is being said on Russia’s home front, Putin has already lost the war and the only question is what face-saving measures can be extracted through a settlement.
The Biden administration has loosened some restrictions on how Ukraine can use U.S.-supplied missiles in its ongoing war with Russia. But this move is too little, too late.
President-elect Trump will likely transform U.S.-Israeli relations — and U.S. relations across the Middle East — by providing more military and diplomatic support for Israel, working to weaken Israel’s adversaries and pursuing more Arab-Israeli peacemaking.
America is often called a nation of problem-solvers. So it's not surprising that, virtually from the start of Israel's war with Hamas last fall, U.S. officials have been pressing Israel to lay out a plan for a "day after" in the Gaza Strip.
The incoming administration has a unique opportunity to cultivate a dynamic partnership with Africa that transcends conventional diplomacy, intensifies economic ties, balances security commitments, and revitalizes development efforts
The campaign of terror carried out by Hamas on Oct. 7, 2023, succeeded in denting Israel's aura of military invincibility, while the resulting conflict in Gaza helped isolate Jerusalem on the world stage. Israel's normalization with the Gulf States, which had started to profoundly marginalize the Islamic Republic, also seemed to be a casualty of the new war. Meanwhile, timid American regional policy, and the Biden administration's overriding fear of a wider Mideast war, led to a persistent failure on Washington's part to hold Tehran accountable for its regional troublemaking.
In recent years, the Biden administration has promoted the need for “resilient, diverse, and secure supply chains” and urged the identification of vulnerabilities that could affect the country’s national security. Interestingly, one of the most visible components in the nation’s supply chain—ocean shipping—matches this description yet is rarely afforded the attention it deserves. That’s a costly mistake because Chinese state-owned shipping is thoroughly embedded in and integrated within the logistics infrastructure of the United States and the West more broadly.
These are decisive days in Tbilisi. On October 26th, voters in the country of Georgiawent to the polls to cast their ballots in a pivotal parliamentary vote. The results of that contest have sent shockwaves through the country and beyond, and raised profound concerns about Georgia’s democratic future.
All eyes are now on next week’s highly-anticipated, and hotly contested, national election. In recent days, we’ve witnessed a flurry of media reports about how malign actors like Russia, China and Iran are seeking to shape U.S. political discourse ahead of that pivotal vote.
In early October, Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov declared a blood feud against three North Caucasian federal lawmakers, accusing them of plotting his assassination amid a power struggle over the Wildberries e-commerce platform.
For almost a year, Israel has been actively at war against terrorists on several fronts. And despite international pressure, adversary propaganda, and the sheer difficulty of the fight, Israel is gradually winning.
In order for the US to proactively shape the contours of the debate within the Iranian opposition it needs to lay out what sort of government it wants in Tehran, and its expectations of the actors that will play a part in bringing about this change. And, given the growing indicators that the Islamic Republic is approaching a fundamental political and social transition, the sooner Washington does so, the better.
At present, Chinese coercion is met largely with a playbook of defensive measures. The Chinese are able to choose the time and location of their action, and the recipient country busies itself scrambling to contain the fallout. China therefore has the initiative, while the targeted country — often in conjunction with the U.S. — mostly tries to mitigate the impact. As a result, it’s tempting to assume that China holds more cards than it actually does. And it’s equally easy for the U.S. to forget the extent of its own leverage over China in the exact same manner.
It is hard to think of a United Nations agency with a more glaring failure in its core mission than the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, more commonly known as UNIFIL — and there has certainly been no shortage of contenders this year.
While global leaders pressure Israel to explain its plans for Gaza after its war with Hamas ends, Palestinian leaders are doing their own planning for that day – and recent developments on that front should raise concerns about prospects for long-term peace between Israel and a future government in Gaza.
Israel Mulls Its Iran Options: With considerable trepidation, the Middle East, and indeed the wider world, is awaiting Israel’s response to Iran’s massive October 1st missile barrage on the Jewish state. The White House, fearful of a wider regional war, is exerting massive (albeit mostly quiet) pressure for Jerusalem to limit its retaliation to something “proportionate” that doesn’t target either Iran’s nuclear program or its energy sites.
As the war in Ukraine heads toward its third anniversary, the question on the minds of many Americans is, why do the Ukrainians keep fighting? The conventional wisdom argues that after nearly three years of killing, the war must end — something possible only through the surrender of Ukrainian land occupied by Russian forces. Yet polls consistently find that nearly 70% of Ukrainians oppose ceding land for peace. Why? Because giving up land means surrendering to life under Russian occupation. Ukrainians know from history what that means; to prevent it, they are willing to endure the deaths of thousands more of their soldiers and the destruction of many of their cities and towns.