Publications

This spring, practically unnoticed by the mainstream media, the battle lines were formally drawn in the “war of ideas.” President George W. Bush used his January 2005 inaugural address to deliver an unapologetic tribute to freedom and the premises that undergird Western liberalism: liberty, the individual, and self-government.In response, Jordanian terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, Osama Bin Laden’s chief lieutenant in Iraq, released an audiotape of his own. In it, he denounced the very principles President Bush has pledged to promote.This frank exchange should serve as a useful primer for all of those who believe that the War on Terror is at its core a struggle against global privation, or a cross-cultural misunderstanding that can be settled by a search for common ground. Quite the opposite is true. We are engaged in an ideological conflict that resists compromise.

The battle for Iraq may still be far from over, but its impact is already sending shockwaves throughout the Middle East. Militarily, Washington's early successes have put to rest any lingering doubts about U.S. capabilities or American resolve. But more significant still is the example set by Iraq's impending liberation, and the accompanying realization that is taking root in the region — that Baghdad's fall could foreshadow even greater change.

A silver lining in the trans-Atlantic storm clouds over Iraq is the damage done to NATO. This costly foreign entanglement was long overdue for a body blow. NATO was not intended, by Americans at least, to be a permanent commitment, but an interim measure while Western Europe recovered from the War. When the first Supreme Allied Commander, Dwight Eisenhower, obtained congressional consent to station U.S. divisions in Europe, he promised and believed they would be there only a few years. But, like Marx's "withering away of the state," Europe proved resilient in allowing America to shoulder Europe's burden long after its prosperity dwarfed the laggard socialist economies and even after the Soviet collapse. The European Union today integrates everything except defense, lest it make too obvious that Europe is more than able to look after itself.

Even as it girds for war in the Persian Gulf, the Bush Administration faces a major challenge in East Asia – that of a nuclear North Korea. The conflict emerged quite suddenly. Back in October, Pyongyang stunned the White House with its unexpected admission of an active clandestine nuclear program. The disclosure was followed, in rapid succession, by the DPRK’s December decision to restart its Yongbyon nuclear facility and expel International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors. A month later, North Korea abruptly withdrew from the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and rolled back its self-imposed 1999 moratorium on missile testing. Together, these moves have presented Washington with an unprecedented – and escalating – problem on the Korean Peninsula.

What a difference a year makes. Twelve months ago, the coalition government of Bulent Ecevit in Turkey had risen to the forefront of U.S. regional allies in the Middle East, contributing heavily to America's Afghan campaign. Today, Washington is deadlocked with Ankara, now led by the Justice and Development Party (AKP), over the next phase in its war on terrorism: military action against Iraq.

The Soviet Union’s demise spelled the end of Russia as a European Great Power, although post-Soviet Russia remains a major European state and a power among others. Less obvious, but equally important, is Russia’s decline as an Asian Great Power. Moscow enjoyed this status for a relatively brief period and in large measure due to the weakness of China, Asia's historic continental hegemon. China’s recovery from external domination set the stage, despite the disasters of Mao’s policies, for its expansion as a major economic and regional political force. Today, China is reclaiming from Russia its place as the leading land power in Asia—the country others must always take into account. This is a momentous transformation in Asian affairs and of great importance to the United States.

What next for the U.S. and Europe? With lingering disagreements over Iraq, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and foreign policy in general, U.S.-EU ties seem headed for increasingly shaky ground. But largely unnoticed amid these differences, there are new signs of life to the transatlantic partnership. Slowly but surely, the Bush administration is working to tighten ties to allies in Europe through an unexpected issue — missile defense.

In 1991, while still Egyptian Foreign Minister, former United Nations Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali cautioned that the next war in the Middle East could be over water. Boutros-Ghali’s warning may have been prophetic, for water is reshaping the political landscape of the contemporary Middle East. For Turkey, water represents one of the most important, though least explored, items on the country’s contemporary security agenda.

The European Union is at it again. Last month, its executive body, the European Commission, voted to accept ten new members over the next two years. The candidates include countries from Eastern Europe, the Baltics, and even the Balkans. Conspicuously absent from the list was Turkey — a key NATO ally and a major partner in the war on terrorism.

In the last days of 2001, with little fanfare or public opposition, a remarkable new law went into effect in Russia. Enacted by President Vladimir Putin and key parliamentary supporters, this legislation officially codifies the procedures for peacefully expanding Russia's borders. It is no less than a blueprint for enlarging the Russian Federation, and one that could foreshadow a major push for "Greater Russia" on the part of the Kremlin.

As another war in Iraq seems to approach, Israelis can feel considerably more secure from missile attack than they did in 1991, when 39 Iraqi Scuds landed in Israel. The reason is the substantial improvement in Israeli missile defenses, an improvement that other nations understandably are seeking for themselves. Among the first in line interested in Israel's Arrow Theater Missile Defense system is, not surprisingly, India. Though the debate over whether to allow the purchase to go forward has not been given much attention, it could have momentous consequences for both American missile defense plans and US strategy in South Asia.

On September 11, as al-Qa‘ida cells prepared to launch their assaults on Washington and New York, a remarkable event was taking place half a world away. In New Delhi, Israeli defense and intelligence officials, led by National Security Advisor Uzi Dayan, were meeting with their Indian counterparts to discuss the common threats facing their two countries. The meeting was anything but routine. It reflected the quickening pace of a strategic partnership that has moved from relative obscurity to the center of Israel's foreign policy agenda. The ties between New Delhi and Jerusalem may have evolved largely away from the international spotlight over the past decade. But they have yielded a strategic dialogue that in many ways mirrors Jerusalem's extensive—and very public—ties with Turkey. Both relationships are now poised on the brink of redefinition. Spurred by a growing consensus on emerging threats and an expanding agenda of shared regional interests, Israel, India, and Turkey are drifting closer together.

Change is brewing in the Islamic Republic. In recent weeks, hundreds of thousands of Iranians have taken to the streets in what amounts to a groundswell of opposition to Tehran's ruling regime. In unprecedented fashion, they have been joined by senior clerics and regime stalwarts like the Ayatollah Jalaleddin Taheri - until recently the Imam of Isfahan - who have publicly condemned the country's growing corruption and deepening decline. But perhaps the most significant event, and the one that could decisively influence the struggle for Iran's soul, has taken place in Washington. Responding to reports of the rising opposition in Iran, US President George W. Bush issued a July 12th statement calling for "freedoms, human rights, and opportunities" and for meaningful change brought about by "political and economic reform."

Amid growing indications of a campaign against Iraq, U.S. officials are taking note of an alarming development. Scattered but not yet decisively defeated, al Qaeda appears to be regrouping — this time on the periphery of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

This spring, amid growing preparations in Washington for a campaign against Iraq, the American intelligence community dropped a major bombshell. Testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee on emerging threats to U.S. security, Admiral Thomas Wilson, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, revealed that “Iran’s navy is the most capable in the region and, even with the presence of Western forces, can probably stem the flow of oil from the Gulf for brief periods by employing a layered force of KILO submarines, missile patrol boats, naval mines, and sea and shore-based anti-ship cruise missiles.” Wilson’s warning underscores a remarkable fact: Iran is back. After years of international isolation and economic decline, Tehran is rapidly reemerging as a major regional player.

Amid the current turmoil in the Middle East, the White House is quietly gearing up for another challenge.This weekend, President Bush will meet Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow in a historic meeting - one that could further define the future of our war on terrorism. By all accounts, the summit is shaping up to be a major success. Over the past several months, an unexpected consensus has emerged between Moscow and Washington on a number of critical international issues. But on one topic - Iran - Moscow and Washington remain worlds apart.

Yasser Arafat is back. Fresh from his extended confinement in Ramallah, the Palestinian leader is again prominently in the press, working hard to spin the latest, disastrous Palestinian intifada into a personal political victory. On May 15, the Palestinian Authority (PA) chairman took his political agenda one step further, testing the waters of a previously taboo topic in the West Bank and Gaza — the future of Palestinian governance. In a major speech before a packed session of the Palestinian Legislative Council, he aired a vague call for "change and reform" within the West Bank and Gaza. "I'm calling for a re-evaluation of all our administrative and ministerial bodies, the security apparatuses, after there have been signs of mismanagement," Arafat told the Palestinian parliament. Nice words to be sure, and music to sympathetic ears in Europe, where efforts to rehabilitate Arafat as a leader and a statesman are already gathering steam. But serious skepticism is in order. After all, Arafat has made this promise before.

Last May, on Vladimir Putin's one-year anniversary as president, throngs of Russians — wearing T-shirts that read "Team Russia: head coach V. V. Putin" — gathered in Moscow to announce that they had "turned their faces toward Russia, and their you-know-what's toward the West." Putin's supporters had a lot to cheer about. Since his ascent to power, the former KGB operative has reestablished Moscow as a major player in world politics. Through a wide range of economic and diplomatic initiatives, the Kremlin is fast reemerging as the preeminent power in Central Asia. Its officials are busy strengthening formidable alliances with China and Iran — and, through much savvy international maneuvering, Russia is well on its way to becoming an energy superpower.

By all indications, U.S.-Russian relations have undergone a sea of change since Sept. 11.Prompted by solidarity with the American tragedy and their own experiences with religious radicalism, Russia has emerged as a key player in America's anti-terror coalition. And Moscow could well prove a valuable ally for Washington. With its large military presence and deep diplomatic influence, the Kremlin's assistance is crucial to any sustained American military campaign in Central Asia.But Russia's support is not likely to come at the expense of its own long-term interests. Even now, Moscow is hard at work on a coalition of its own -- one that could very well undermine American strategy in the region.

Since Vladimir Putin's assumption of the Russian presidency in December of 1999, Moscow's foreign policy has changed course. The norm is no longer President Yel'tsin's sometimes halting embrace of Europe and the West, which persisted in spite of pressures both from hard-liners within his own government (such as Foreign Minister -- and later Prime Minister -- Yevgeny Primakov) and from the secret police and intelligence organs. Instead, under Putin's direction, Russia's manipulation of foreign affairs -- despite fluctuations in tone -- generally appears to be more aggressive and "geopolitical," raising worries about renewed imperial aspirations on the part of the Kremlin.