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It's probably safe to assume that Australian Internet activist Julian Assange wasn't thinking specifically about Iran when his brainchild, the information clearinghouse WikiLeaks, released its latest round of classified U.S. government cables. Still, the data dump, encompassing more than a quarter-million internal memos issued by the State Department and U.S. embassies overseas, successfully demolishes a number of sacred cows relating to American policy toward the Islamic republic and its burgeoning nuclear effort.

President Barack Obama's 10-day tour through Asia is being deemed a disappointment in some Washington circles after the President failed to secure a free trade with South Korea, or forge a consensus on issues of currency manipulation and trade imbalances. However, the President's underwhelming performance in East Asia risks overshadowing his more commendable performance in South Asia, where President Obama announced that America now supports a permanent seat for India at the United Nations Security Council. The policy change was warmly received in New Delhi, where politicians have been lobbying the U.S. for such an endorsement for years (not even the Indophile Bush administration was willing to offer one). And while there is little likelihood that India's Security Council aspirations will be fulfilled anytime soon, President Obama's announcement at least temporarily silenced critics who had begun to question the President's commitment to the U.S.-India partnership.

For the moment, Muhammad Ibrahim Makawi is still far from a household name. Outside of a small corpus of terrorism experts and national security specialists, few people are familiar with the Egyptian-born militant who is arguably al-Qaeda’s most dangerous operative. But they should be. Mounting evidence suggests that, after years of absence, Makawi—better known by his nom de guerre, Saif al-Adel (“sword of justice” in Arabic)—is back in action and spearheading a new stage in al-Qaeda’s war with the West.

It’s a tried-and-true tenet of warfare, showcased throughout centuries of combat, that it is a great deal easier to attack than to defend. Attacking forces have the luxury of setting the time, the place and the means by which conflict is joined, while defenders are forced to anticipate the actions and objectives of their adversaries—or suffer the consequences.

In the age of modern terrorism, those consequences could mean another 9/11, or worse. And while the United States has fared better than most in thwarting these kind of attacks (the Heritage Foundation estimates that the U.S. government has successfully foiled over 30 significant terrorist plots since September 2001), talk to any counterterrorism professional and you’ll come away with the impression that America, like its allies abroad, is still very much playing defense.

Last week, Iran rolled out the red carpet for an unlikely dignitary. The visitor wasn’t Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, the spiritual head of the Hezbollah Shi’ite militia Iran created in Lebanon in the early 1980s and has sustained since. Nor was it Nouri al-Maliki, Iraq’s newly-reconfirmed prime minister, whom—having failed to supplant in favor of a more pliable politician in recent elections—Tehran is now actively courting. Rather, the head-of-state that garnered Tehran’s most lavish diplomatic reception was none other than Venezuelan strongman Hugo Chavez, who over the past decade has emerged as one of Iran’s most dependable international allies.

There is trouble on the high seas. Few doubted China’s astonishing economic and geopolitical rise would fuel competition and rivalry with the United States and China’s Asian neighbors. Most observers, however, have been left guessing where the first serious points of conflict would emerge. We may have been given our answer this summer: in the disputed and crowded waters of the Asian Pacific, where overlapping claims of sovereignty and territorial rights among the United States, China and a handful of East Asian nations have spilled into confrontation and political brinkmanship this year.

This Sunday marks 20 years since German unification. It also coincides with a low point in the commitment of post-war Germany to European unity. The two are directly related.

Alone in Europe, the people of the former German Democratic Republic (East Germany) did not have to qualify for entry into the European Union. German unification made them automatically full-fledged members.

Nothing was asked of East Germans for this extraordinary benefit. Nor were they educated about the European project and Germany’s unique role, based on its history, in building a common European home.

All other former Soviet-bloc countries — Poland, Hungary, Latvia, etc. — had to work hard for E.U. membership, both in the complex formal qualifications and through years of learning to become “European” in a pragmatic sense. For these countries, entering “Europe” was a long-sought goal and finally a celebrated achievement. Eastern Germany never moved up this learning curve.

For quite a while now, policymakers in Washington have worked diligently to try and test a simple hypothesis: that energy sanctions can help derail Iran’s march toward the bomb.

Over the years, this effort has taken the form of a number of legislative initiatives aimed at curtailing Tehran’s energy trade with the world. Of late, however, American pressure has honed in on Iran’s most glaring economic dependency, its deep reliance on foreign refined petroleum. The culmination was the passage by Congress this summer of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability and Divestment Act, a sweeping set of new provisions aimed in large measure at throttling the Iranian regime’s oil sector.

Can sanctions stop Iran's nuclear drive? Since the passage of new U.S. and multilateral measures this summer, there have been unmistakable signs that Iran has begun to feel the economic pinch. Prompted by mounting international pressure, a slew of foreign multinationals have exited the Iranian market, while a range of countries - from South Korea to the United Arab Emirates - are in the process of curtailing their financial dealings with the Islamic republic.

But, despite these heartening signs, the ultimate success of sanctions depends on what could come after. In order for economic pressure to be taken seriously in Tehran, Iran's leaders must be convinced that their continued intransigence on the nuclear front will lead to something far worse.

For the moment, at least, they clearly are not. That is in large part because, despite repeated assurances from U.S. officials that "all options remain on the table" in dealing with the Iranian regime, Tehran has been permitted to wage not one but two irregular wars against America for more than half a decade and to do so with virtual impunity.

If economic sanctions fail to stop Iran's march toward the bomb, and either the U.S. or Israel is compelled to use force against the Iranian nuclear program, China will shoulder at least some of the blame.

Since this summer, concerted international pressure has unmistakably tightened the financial noose around Iran's ayatollahs. The June passage of a new round of United Nations sanctions against the Islamic Republic has been followed by an exodus of European and Asian firms from the Iranian market, and new, stricter regulations on financial dealings with the regime in Tehran. Simultaneously, unilateral American sanctions have honed in on Iran's most glaring economic vulnerability—its deep dependence on supplies of refined petroleum from abroad—with marked results. According to energy consultancy EMC, Iran's gasoline imports plummeted by 50 percent, from 120,000 to 60,000 barrels per day, in the month after the imposition of U.S. sanctions, as skittish foreign suppliers scrambled to exit the Iranian market.

But the push to isolate Iran economically may end up being undermined by a key global actor. China's leaders may have reluctantly gone along with the latest round of Security Council sanctions passed this summer. Yet, even as other foreign stakeholders have constricted their financial stakes in Iran, Beijing has done the opposite.