Israeli leaders must be suffering whiplash as they watch the dizzying events of recent days across the Middle East, with President Donald Trump sidelining the Jewish state and cozying up to some of its bitter rivals.
As President Trump explores a nuclear deal with Iran, he would be wise to recognize that Tehran probably comes to the negotiating table less because it fears Washington than because it smells opportunity.
In recent days several Russian bloggers—both loyalists and oppositionists—have hinted about plots to remove Putin. Even though most such reports are based on little more than gossip, they serve the useful function of reminding us that Putin’s clock is running down.
As every tourist who has strayed into a bazaar or souk knows, Middle Easterners drive a hard bargain. And the Iranians, with their long history of strategy and commerce, are among the region's most savvy negotiators. President Trump's pointman for the region, Steve Witkoff, is finding this out the hard way.
America needs to design and implement an effective strategy for Greater Central Asia to enhance the United States's competitive position in a region that will affect the Russia-China relationship, the geopolitical competition in Asia, and key resource markets, particularly uranium, oil, and natural gas.
Kadyrov's Chechnya presents a deepening dilemma for Russia's federal state. Putin relies on Kadyrov for stability in exchange for unprecedented autonomy—a system where "personalized loyalty substitutes for institutional coherence." This arrangement has created a parallel power structure where Kadyrov implements religious legal codes, commands his independent Kadyrovtsy militia, and pursues contradictory foreign policies.
The paradox is clear: Moscow's strategy to suppress separatism has created a regional actor whose "loyalty is conditional and whose power increasingly transcends the bounds of federation." This precedent could inspire other republics like Tatarstan and Bashkortostan to seek similar arrangements. With Russia facing pressure from sanctions and war costs, Moscow's options are limited if Kadyrov's loyalty wavers.
Trump’s tariff agenda is not simply a policy preference; it is essential for the security and safety of the United States in the decades to come.
If its imperial vision isn’t decisively defeated, any peace agreement with Russia over Ukraine is guaranteed to be merely temporary.
Once upon a time, the Middle Eastern media environment was predictable and staid, dominated by a few prominent outlets that in Arab countries were often owned and operated by the governments’ information ministries. No longer.
“Who controls the Rimland rules Eurasia [and] who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world.”
UN’s Human Rights Council set to mock itself – The United Nations Human Rights Council is expected to reappoint its special rapporteur on the Palestinian territories, Francesca Albanese, to a second three-year term on Friday, mocking its own mandate to fairly and seriously investigate human rights problems around the world.
On March 20, Iranians in Iran and in the diaspora commemorated Nowruz, the Persian New Year. Typically, U.S. administrations have used the occasion to practice some soft power diplomacy. In the past, America's Nowruz greetings have taken pains to highlight Iran's proud pre-Islamic heritage, underscore its immense civilizational potential, and draw a distinction between the country's historic greatness and its current repressive clerical regime.
Now, as Hamas retakes control of Gaza after a two-month ceasefire with Israel and reconstitutes its capacity to resume its terror, classified documents published in recent days by the Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center highlight Israel’s desperate need to restore a sense of deterrence in the minds of its bitterest enemies.
Meanwhile, the new White House's penchant for deal-making is providing an opportunity for Russia to improve its position still further—by offering itself up as a diplomatic intermediary between Washington and Tehran.
A desire to end conflict will not suffice in achieving an actual end to hostilities in either Ukraine or Gaza.
When the Soviet Union collapsed nearly a quarter-century ago, it led to triumphalism about the "end of history" and the ultimate victory of liberal democracy over other forms of government. Since then, it's been a difficult couple of decades for global freedom.
It might be too much for the Trump administration to expect that Europe will guarantee a Ukraine peace settlement they had no part in making.
A Central Asia-Caucasus-European Corridor (CACE) would reinvigorate historic trade routes and improve regional energy security.
For all of its public rhetoric to the contrary, Europe has failed to meaningfully wean itself off Russian energy, a key strategic vulnerability. In fact, the continent's dependence on Moscow has grown...
But lest anyone believe that Israel’s detractors in the region and across the world really care about innocent Gazans, events on the ground since the ceasefire took effect show that’s truly a farcical notion.
When scholars look back at the foreign policy of the last administration, they’re liable to conclude that the “Biden Doctrine,” to the extent that there was one, wasn’t an elaborate, ambitious and well-thought-out affair, the way some pundits have suggested. Rather, it was a series of tactical responses to world events — responses that were ultimately undermined by the White House’s fear of adverse consequences.
As strife abates, countries are remembering why ties to Israel are a good bet.
As he prepares to enter the White House, Donald Trump should recognize that even a weakened Tehran is still dangerous.
Prioritizing the Americas after decades of neglect marks a return to traditional U.S. strategy.
Suddenly, Israel has a Syria problem. For years, officials in Jerusalem had banked on a relatively predictable balance of power with the neighboring regime of Bashar al-Assad in Damascus. Despite Assad's enduring hostility toward the Jewish state and the inherent weakness of his regime, a tenuous status quo had been struck between the two countries, making it generally possible to anticipate how the Syrian dictator would behave. This has served as a perverse source of comfort over the past 14 months, as Israel has found itself preoccupied with the threat of Hamas in the Gaza Strip, and more recently, that of Hezbollah in Lebanon.
When might meaningful change come to Iran, and how? Nearly 50 years after the country's last major political transformation – the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's radical Islamist revolt against the monarchy of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi – that question continues to bedevil policymakers, both in Washington and far beyond the Capital Beltway.
For years, Russia’s main tactic to compete with Western news media has been to create alternative outlets, like its television channel RT (previously Russia Today) and the Sputnik multimedia news agency. Now, however, Moscow is stepping up its efforts in two areas where Western media and foundations have long enjoyed an advantage: journalism training and fact-checking.
What if Russia loses its war on Ukraine? Some consider the question frivolous because, as President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev of Kazakhstan has asserted, “Russia cannot be defeated in a military sense.” Such thinking has prompted Tokayev, as well as many in the West, to advocate for a deal with Putin, one that would more than likely result in Kyiv’s loss of land that the United Nations, the United States, and Europe all consider Ukraine’s sovereign territory.
The U.S. Congress still has a month of legislating ahead. If current conditions hold, China policy appears poised to dominate a significant portion of Capitol Hill’s time. In September, House Speaker Mike Johnson telegraphed his desire to restrict U.S. outbound investment to the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and moves in this direction are expected this fall.
On November 28, 2024, the ruling Georgian Dream (GD) party explicitly announced a change in Georgia's foreign policy trajectory, despite overwhelming public opposition to turning away from European integration.
As Georgia approaches parliamentary elections in October 2024, the South Caucasus state stands at a pivotal juncture.
When the second Trump administration takes office next month, it will face a thoroughly crowded Mideast agenda. Near-term priorities for the new White House include helping Israel to wind down its war in Gaza, resuscitating the Abraham Accords, and reviving a policy of "maximum pressure" against Iran. But arguably the most pressing item confronting Team Trump will be changing the status quo in the Red Sea.
Western observers are neglecting important developments: Judging by what is being said on Russia’s home front, Putin has already lost the war and the only question is what face-saving measures can be extracted through a settlement.
The Biden administration has loosened some restrictions on how Ukraine can use U.S.-supplied missiles in its ongoing war with Russia. But this move is too little, too late.
President-elect Trump will likely transform U.S.-Israeli relations — and U.S. relations across the Middle East — by providing more military and diplomatic support for Israel, working to weaken Israel’s adversaries and pursuing more Arab-Israeli peacemaking.
America is often called a nation of problem-solvers. So it's not surprising that, virtually from the start of Israel's war with Hamas last fall, U.S. officials have been pressing Israel to lay out a plan for a "day after" in the Gaza Strip.
The incoming administration has a unique opportunity to cultivate a dynamic partnership with Africa that transcends conventional diplomacy, intensifies economic ties, balances security commitments, and revitalizes development efforts
The campaign of terror carried out by Hamas on Oct. 7, 2023, succeeded in denting Israel's aura of military invincibility, while the resulting conflict in Gaza helped isolate Jerusalem on the world stage. Israel's normalization with the Gulf States, which had started to profoundly marginalize the Islamic Republic, also seemed to be a casualty of the new war. Meanwhile, timid American regional policy, and the Biden administration's overriding fear of a wider Mideast war, led to a persistent failure on Washington's part to hold Tehran accountable for its regional troublemaking.
In recent years, the Biden administration has promoted the need for “resilient, diverse, and secure supply chains” and urged the identification of vulnerabilities that could affect the country’s national security. Interestingly, one of the most visible components in the nation’s supply chain—ocean shipping—matches this description yet is rarely afforded the attention it deserves. That’s a costly mistake because Chinese state-owned shipping is thoroughly embedded in and integrated within the logistics infrastructure of the United States and the West more broadly.
These are decisive days in Tbilisi. On October 26th, voters in the country of Georgiawent to the polls to cast their ballots in a pivotal parliamentary vote. The results of that contest have sent shockwaves through the country and beyond, and raised profound concerns about Georgia’s democratic future.
All eyes are now on next week’s highly-anticipated, and hotly contested, national election. In recent days, we’ve witnessed a flurry of media reports about how malign actors like Russia, China and Iran are seeking to shape U.S. political discourse ahead of that pivotal vote.
In early October, Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov declared a blood feud against three North Caucasian federal lawmakers, accusing them of plotting his assassination amid a power struggle over the Wildberries e-commerce platform.
For almost a year, Israel has been actively at war against terrorists on several fronts. And despite international pressure, adversary propaganda, and the sheer difficulty of the fight, Israel is gradually winning.
In order for the US to proactively shape the contours of the debate within the Iranian opposition it needs to lay out what sort of government it wants in Tehran, and its expectations of the actors that will play a part in bringing about this change. And, given the growing indicators that the Islamic Republic is approaching a fundamental political and social transition, the sooner Washington does so, the better.
At present, Chinese coercion is met largely with a playbook of defensive measures. The Chinese are able to choose the time and location of their action, and the recipient country busies itself scrambling to contain the fallout. China therefore has the initiative, while the targeted country — often in conjunction with the U.S. — mostly tries to mitigate the impact. As a result, it’s tempting to assume that China holds more cards than it actually does. And it’s equally easy for the U.S. to forget the extent of its own leverage over China in the exact same manner.